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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/05/2006 Accident number: 165 
Accident time: 08:27 Accident Date: 23/12/1997 




Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: CMAC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: electromagnetic 
hard 
Date record created: 14/02/2004 Date  last modified: 14/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: MF M2822 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group operated in a two-man drill whereby one 
deminer used the detector and marked any signals while the other looked for tripwires, cut 
undergrowth and excavated any detector readings. A third deminer may have been resting [it 
is not known whether the group had changed from three-man to two-man teams at this time]. 
A brief accident report in Khmer was found at the country MAC in January 1999. The 
translated content is summarised here. 
1 
The accident occurred on the bank of a pond that was drying up. The ground was very hard 
and minerals in the ground made clearance operations difficult. The platoon was clearing a 
path to the pond so that the operation had access to water. An ex-Khmer Rouge soldier 
informed the platoon that a large number of Type 72A mines had been laid around the pond 
and the water had been poisoned with insecticide. Two deminers from the same demining 
group had accidents in the area on 28th August and 19th November 1997.  
On the morning of the accident the victim was working as a prodder man on an upward incline 
of 30o. The detector man got a reading, marked it and called to the victim to investigate. As 
the victim was excavating he saw a white metal tube about the size of a finger but did not 
recognise what it was. He continued to prod around it and he initiated the mine with the tip of 
his prodder.  
The victim suffered many superficial injuries on his arms, thighs, on his face and on his chest. 
His eyes were filled with dust but were probably saved from more serious injury by the safety 
spectacles, as indicated by the debris found on the lenses. [He lost an eye later.] 
An investigation of the accident site revealed that the ground was very hard and there was 
evidence of excavating by working from cracks in the ground. Considerable force was needed 
to break the ground.  
The victim gave a statement saying that he had to squat on the slope and so the explosion 
occurred at chest height. He said he was able to walk away from the accident site but was 
aware of dust in his eyes. 
 
Conclusion 
The crater measured 14cm deep and 22cm wide, but no evidence of a mine was found. For 
this reason the report concluded that the victim had detonated a B40 (RPG) with the tip of his 
prodder, or the victim prodded onto a Type 72a and all the fragments were blown into the 
pond behind him. The investigators could not be certain because no mine fragments were 
found. 
The investigators decided that the victim had not softened the ground with water, had failed to 
prod at 30o, had not prodded at 2cm intervals and had used excessive force. The victim did 
not have enough room to lie down to prod and so had to squat. The investigators believed 
that if he had being lying down he might have suffered more severe injuries. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 210 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 1 hour 33 minutes 
Protection issued: Safety spectacles Protection used: Safety spectacles 
 











See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's eyes were both swollen and full of dust and sand, and he had minor injuries to 
his chest, upper arms and thighs. The accident occurred at 08:27 and he arrived at Mongkul 
Borey Hospital at 10:00.  
A doctor's note in the file stated that the victim's right eye became infected by dust from the 
explosion and it was removed on 27th December 1997 to prevent infection spreading to the 
other eye. 
The victim left hospital on the 30th January 1998. The doctor was of the opinion that he was 
able to work. 




The primary and secondary cause of this accident are listed as “Unavoidable" because it 
seems likely that the victim was working according to his SOPs when the accident occurred. 
The investigators decided that the victim had been working improperly but their failure to 
determine whether the explosion involved a fragmentation or a blast device does not give 
confidence in their experience. [A fragmentation device would almost certainly have caused 
fragmentation injury if any of the associated blast hit the victim, so a blast device or fuze is 
assumed.]  
There is some evidence that the victim was not provided with appropriate tools and was 
expected to work in a situation that made an accident likely.  
The investigators stressed the belief that the victim was better off squatting than lying prone 
and did not criticise his breach of the group's published SOPs. This illustrates a schism in the 
group's management. The group's office management and many Technical Advisors said the 
deminers must work one way, while the field supervisors allowed them to work in another.   
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